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January 2009  I. Introduction
Rising income inequality is of growing concern in the U.S. and other developed countries.
As Piketty and Saez (2003) and Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007) show, the top share of
income received by top U.S. income decile increased from 27 percent in the 1960s percent
to roughly 45 percent today.1 What explains this trend? The answer depends on who one
asks. Lawrence (2008) and Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007) point to superstar agglom-
eration economies and CEO manipulation that has raised income inequality even within
the top decile. Bound and Johnson's (1992) and Hornstein, et. al. (2005) trace diverging
incomes to skill-biased technical change. Card and Di Nardo (2002) and Lemieux (2006)
emphasize real reductions in the minimum wage and changes in labor force composition.
And Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), Sachs and Shatz (1996), and Wood (1998) point
to globalization.
Resolving these dierences is important. But understanding past inequality will not
necessarily answer this paper's central question { how will wage inequality change in the
future? To address this issue, we develop a dynamic, general equilbrium life-cycle model
featuring competition among ve regions {the U.S., the EMU, Northeast Asia (Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), China, and India. Each of these regions produces six
goods, three of which are traded. The goods are produced with capital and low-, middle-,
and high-skilled labor.
The model, which pays careful attention to region-specic dierences in demographics,
scal conditions, and productivity, foresees more wage inequality over time. Indeed, it
predicts a near doubling of the ratio of high- to low-skilled wage rates over the century.
The source of this rising wage gap arises from a traditional source { an increase in the
worldwide relative supply of unskilled labor thanks to Chinese and Indian productivity
improvements. In calibrating the model, we assume that the productivity of new cohorts
of workers in regions other than the U.S. catches up to the U.S. level over time. We set
this catch-up period at 10 years for the EMU and Northeast Asia, 15 years for China,
and 75 years for India. Once catch-up of new cohorts occurs, it takes a generation for
all older worker cohorts in non-U.S. regions to be replaced by younger ones that are as
productive as American workers.
New worker cohorts in a given region are assumed to enter the labor force with the
same skill mix as older workers in that region. Hence, China and India, whose current
work forces are disporportionately low skilled, continue to generate new worker cohorts
that are disproportionately low-skilled. But as the productivity of Chinese and Indian
workers, of all three skill types, rises and ultimately converges to the U.S. level, the world
1These gures are from Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007). See Hornstein, et. al. (2005), Eckstein and
Nagypal (2004), and Autor, et. al. (2006, 2008) for additional evidence of rising U.S. wage inequality.
1experiences a major increase in its relative endowment of low-skilled, and to a lesser
extent, middle-skilled workers.
These changes in relative world-wide factor endowments spell increasing wage-rate in-
equality. In 2005, our model's base year, the wage, measured in eciency units, of
high-skilled workers is 5.8 times higher than that of low-skilled workers. At the end
of the century, it's 10.1 times higher. The ratio of the high-skilled wage rate to the
middle-skilled wage rate starts at 1.9 in 2005 and ends at 2.3 in 2100.
China's and India's very high saving rates, which we assume decline gradually through
time (via increases in these countries' time preference rates), help maintain a healthy
world-wide ratio of capital to labor. But this fails to prevent the low-skilled wage rate,
measured in eciency units, from falling in absolute terms { by 32 percent { over the
century. In contrast, the high-skilled wage rate rises by 18 percent. Middle-skilled workers
see their wage rates, again measured in eciency units, stagnate. In 2100, they are
1 percent lower than in 2005. Shutting down trade with China and India materially
improves the prospects of low-skilled workers, but comes at a high economic price to
developed regions' economies, whose long-run GDPs are reduced by almost 20 percent.
Another casulty is the wage-rate of high-skilled workers, which end up one quarter lower
than occurs with free trade.
In arguing that changes in world wide factor endowments will increasingly undermine
the prospects of low- and, to a lesser extent, middle-skilled workers, we don't claim
that this troubling aspect of globalization has been the dominant force raising income
inequality in recent decades. As Lawrence (2008) and Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007)
show, increases in the relative remuneration of the top 1 percent of earners explains
much of what has been happening. Their explanations include superstar-agglomeration
economies and compensation extraction by top management. Such explanations ring
true, and these factors may continue to exert an in
uence on relative pay. But they
are likely to be a side show to the main event, namely the ongoing arrival of hundreds
of millions of low- and middle-skilled Chinese and Indian workers increasingly able to
compete on equal terms with low- and middle-skilled workers in the developed world.
Worsening wage inequality is not, however, inevitable. If Chinese and Indian education
policies limit growth in the world's relative supply of unskilled workers, the exacerbation
of wage inequality can, as we show, be substantially mitigated. Indeed, if China and
India end up producing workers with the same skill mix as the U.S., relative wages
over the century will remain essentially unchanged. Hence, one way for the developed
world to improve the lot of its low-skilled workers is to help improve China's and India's
educational systems.
Our study builds on Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotliko (2007), which excluded India, Taiwan,
2Hong Kong, and Korea. It also posited just one good produced with capital and a one
type of labor. This single labor input comprised the sum of eective units of labor
supplied by workers with low, middle, and high labor-eciency coecients. The basic
message of this earlier work is that high-saving developing regions can help low-saving
developed countries maintain a high level of capital intensivity along their demographic
transition paths. What that study was unable to examine, however, was how badly low-
wage workers might be hurt by global trade and whether the harm to low-wage workers
would worsen over time.
As before, we incorporate a rich demographic structure and model scal institutions in
detail. Agents give birth to fractions of children at each child-bearing age, with future
age-specic birth rates closely tracking government projections. After age 67, agents die
randomly based on current and projected mortality probabilities. Immigration is treated
as exogenous, again based on current and forecasted patterns. Each region has progressive
tax and transfer benet systems. By modifying these system, we can study how scal
policies alter international, intergeneration, and intrageneration distributions of welfare.
Sections 2 and 3 describe, in turn, the model, calibration, and data sources. Section 4
presents baseline and alternative policy results, including shutting down trade with China
and India and changing Chinese and Indian education policy, and section 5 summarizes
key ndings and concludes.
II. Model
We start with demographics and then clarify household economic behavior, rm behavior,
the macroeconomic equilibrium, and scal institutions.
1. Demographics
Agents in each region live at most to age 90. Consequently, there are 91 generations
with surviving members at any point in time. The life cycle of a representative agent
is described in Figure 1. Between ages 0 and 20 our agents are non-working children
supported by their parents. At 21 our agents go to work and become individual house-
holds. Between ages 23 and 45 our agents give birth each year to fractions of children.
An agent's rst-born children (fractions of children) leave home when the parents are age
43 and the last-born leave when the agents are age 66. Our agents die between ages 68
and 90. The probability of death is 1 at age 91. Children always outlive their parents,
meaning that parents always outlive grandparents.2
We denote the population vector for year t by N(a;t;s;k); where a = 1;:::;90; s =
23;:::;45; k = 1;2;3. The term s references the age of the parent at the time of birth
2If a parent reaches age 90, his or her oldest children will be 67. These are children who were born
when the parent was age 23.
3Figure 1: The individual life-cycle
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23  a  65; k = 1;2;3; (1)
where u = max(0;a   45) and m = min(20;a   23). Recall that agents younger than
23 have no children and those over 65 have only adult children, i.e. KID(a;t;k) = 0
for 0  a  22 and 66  a  90. Agents between these ages have children. Take, for
example, a 30 year-old agent. Such an agent has children who were born in the years
(a   l) since she/he was 23. In year t, these children are between age 0  l  7. The
KID-function (1) sums the total number of children of the respective parent skill-class
generation and divides it by the total number of parents of age a in year t who belong to
skill k. This function takes into account that the family's age structure will change over
time due to changes over time in age-specic fertility.3
Our treatment of immigration is, by necessity, simple. In each year new immigrants in
each skill and age group arrive with the same number and age distribution of children
and the same level of assets as natives of the identical skill and age. Once they join a
native cohort, they experience the same future age-specic fertility and mortality rates
as native-born agents.
2. The Household Sector
The model's preference structure is represented by a time-separable, nested, CES utility
function. Remaining lifetime utility U(l;t;s;k) of a generation age l at time t whose
parents were age s at their time of birth and who belong to skill-class k takes the form
U(l;t;s;k) = V (l;t;s;k) + H(l;t;s;k); (2)
where V (l;t;s;k) records the agent's utility from her/his own goods and leisure consump-
tion and H(l;t;s;k) denotes the agent's utility from the consumption of her/his children.
3This approach permits the distribution of births by the ages of parents to change over time { an
important improvement relative to the birthing process stipulated in Kotliko, Smetters and Walliser
(2007).

















































denotes the aggregate consumption good, while c(j;a;i;s;k) and `(a;i;k;s) denote con-
sumption of goods j 2 f1;2;3;4g and leisure respectively, i = t + a   l, and (j;a)
denes the consumption share of good j at age a, with
P4
j=1 (j;a) = 1. In permitting
these shares to vary with age, our model can accommodate age-related changes in, for
example, demand for medical services. The elasticity of substitution between dierent
consumption goods j is denoted by !; where ' = 1   1
!. The price index  p(a;i) for the











where p(j;i) denes the consumer price of good j in year i.4 The children's aggregate
consumption of skill-class k parents who are age a in period i and whose parents were age
s at the time of their birth is dened as  cK(a;i;s;k), and the number of children supported
by parents age a is KID(a;i;k) (see equation (1)). We assume that parents apply the
same consumption shares (j;a) and substitution elasticities ! when they decide upon
their children's consumption cK(j;a;i;s;k).
Since lifespan is uncertain, the utility of consumption in future periods is weighted by




[1   d(u;u   a + i)]; (7)
which is determined by multiplying the conditional survival probabilities from year t
(when the agent's age is l) through year i. Note that d(l;t) is the mortality probability
of an agent age l in year t. The parameters ;;" and 
 represent the rate of time
preference, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure,
4Note that the price index is independent of skill class since we assume identical consumption shares
in each skill class.
5the leisure preference parameter, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure, respectively.










  T(l;t;s;k)    p(l;t)

 c(l;t;s;k) + KID(l;t;k) cK(l;t;s;k)

; (8)
where r(t) is the pre-tax return, I(l;t;s;k) denotes inheritance received in year t. The
budget incorporates our assumption that annuity markets are not operative. Instead,
agents who die leave unintended bequests to their children. These children share equally
in their parents' estates as well as in all the estates of other parents in the same skill
group who die in that year. Thus, 50 year-olds in year t whose parents were age 28 when
they were born will inherit an equal share of all the assets left by 78 year-old decedents
in year t, where the total inheritors include all children of these decedents, not just those
age 50. To be precise, the inheritance of agents age l in year t whose parents were age s
at their birth are given by:
I(l;t;s;k) =
d(l + s;t)  A(l + s;t;k)
P45
u=23 N(l + s   u;t;u;k)
: (9)
The numerator in this ratio measures the aggregate assets of skill-class k parents who die
in year t at age l + s: The denominator measures the total number of children of these
parents who are between ages l+s 45 and l+s 23 in year t. The receipt of inheritances
requires us to distinguish members of each cohort according to the ages of their parents at
the time the cohort members were born. The parents' ages at death determine when the
children receive their inheritances. While the oldest children (born when their parents
are age 23) receive their inheritances between ages 45 and 67, the youngest (born when
their parents are age 45) receive their inheritances between ages 23 and 45.5
As in Altig, et. al. (2001) and Kotliko, Smetters and Walliser (2007), we model techni-
cal progress as permitting successive generations to use time more eectively, whether in
working or enjoying leisure. We implement this assumption by having the time endow-
ment of successive generations in each region grow at the common rate . Denote h(a;i)
as the time endowment of an agent age a at time i, then
h(a;i) = (1 + )h(a;i   1): (10)
5Note that in providing children each year with the average inheritance left by all parents of the same
age as their own parents, we avoid introducing uncertainty with respect to the amount of inheritance
received each year. Hence, our model incorporates idiosyncratic uncertainty about one's date of death,
but certainty with respect to what one inherits.
6This treatment of technical change ensures eventual convergence of the economy to a
long-run steady state. Other formulations of technical change, such as making it labor-
augmenting, preclude a steady state given the model's preferences. And our iterative
method for determining the model's equilibrium transition path requires the terminal
conditions provided by the economy's long-run steady state.6
Gross labor income of an agent in year i is derived as the product of her labor supply
and wage rate. The latter is the product of the skill-specic wage rate w(k;i) in year i





where i = t + a   l. Apart from the term (i), this prole is taken from Auerbach and
Kotliko (1987). Note that the higher is the rate of technological change, , the steeper
is the age-ability prole. This captures the role of technical progress in in
uencing not
just the level, but also the shape of longitudinal age-earnings proles. The productivity
catch-up parameter, (i), is region-specic. It's initially set to 0.65 in the EMU, 0.5 in
NEA, 0.018 in China, and 0.01 in India, with these values chosen to match relative GDPs
by region. Catch-up to the U.S. productivity level takes, as mentioned, 10 years for the
EMU and NEA, 15 years for China, and 75 years for India, with the catch-up occuring
linearly. Again, catch-up references the productivity new cohorts joining the workforce.
In the case of China, for example, catch-up of new cohorts takes 10 years, but it takes 55
years for all Chinese workers with a given level of skill to have the same productivity as
equally-skilled U.S. workers.
Net taxes, T(l;t;s;k), include consumption, capital income, and progressive wage taxes as
well as social security contributions net of pension, disability, and health benets received
in the form of transfer payments. Given the assumed ceiling on payroll tax contributions,
payroll tax rates, both average and marginal, dier across agents. Each agent's pension
benets depend on her pre-retirement earnings history, while healthcare and disability
transfers are provided on a per capita basis.
Given price indices  p(a;i), interest rates r(i); and wages w(k;i), agents maximize utility
(2) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (8) and the constraint that leisure
in each period not exceed the time endowment (i.e. `(l;t;s;k)  h(l;t)). They do
this by choosing their leisure and consumption demands, i.e., `(l;t;s;k); c(a;i;s;k) and
6Note that assuming a higher rate of technical progress is isomorphic to assuming a higher rate
of fertility; i.e., having more people is equivalent to having fewer people who each have more time.
Since fertility rates don't enter into production functions, we circumvent the problem of steady-state
incompatibility.








Given individual consumption and leisure, agents' asset levels are derived from (8). Ag-
gregate values of assets, consumption, and labor supply obey

































Since households die at the beginning of each period, we aggregate across all agents alive
at the end of the prior period to compute  A(a+1;t+1;k), which is used in the calculation
of bequests (see (9)). Total assets of agents alive at the end of period t + 1 satises







a(a;t + 1;s;k)N(a;t + 1;s;k); (16)
which includes the assets and numbers of period t + 1 immigrants.
3. The Production Sector
Each region produces all six goods. Aggregate output Y (j;t) of each good j is produced
via a Cobb-Douglas technology that uses capital K(j;t) and skill-specic labor L(k;j;t),
i.e.,








; for j = 1;:::;6 (17)
where
P3
k=1 (k;j) = 1. The parameter  references total factor productivity, and (j)
and (k;j) denote capital's share and the share of skill-specic labor inputs in production,
respectively.
Prot maximization requires
[r(t) + K]K(j;t) = (j)q(j;t)Y (j;t) (18)
w(k;t)L(k;j;t) = [1   (j)](k;j)q(j;t)Y (j;t); (19)
8where K is the depreciation rate and q(j;t) denotes the producer price of good j in t.
4. The Government Sector
Each region's government issues additional debt, B(t); and collect taxes to nance
general government expenditures q(6;t)C(6;t), those pension, healthcare, and disability












dDB(t) + r(t)B(t); (20)
where %p, %h, and %d denote shares of these transfer payments that are nanced by general
revenues.
Each government maintains its initial debt-to-output ratio over time. The progressivity
of wage taxation is modelled after Auerbach and Kotliko (1987), with marginal wage tax
rates rising linearly with the wage-tax base. PY (t) denes the aggregate payroll-tax base,
which diers from total labor earnings due to the ceiling on taxable wages. This ceiling
is xed at 290, 200, 150, 300, and 300 percent of average income in the U.S., EMU,
NEA, China, and India, respectively. Average payroll tax rates { ^ p; ^ h and ^ d { for
the pension, healthcare, and disability transfer programs are determined based on each
region's transfer-program-specic budget, taking into account general revenue nance,
i.e.
^ 
p(t)PY (t) = (1   %
p)PB(t); ^ 
h(t)PY (t) = (1   %
h)HB(t);
^ 
d(t)PY (t) = (1   %
d)DB(t); (21)
where PB(t);HB(t) and DB(t) are total outlays of the pension, health care, and disabil-
ity systems, respectively. In China and India disability insurance provisions is handled by
state pension systems and these systems don't separate disability and pension payments
in their reporting. Hence, for these countries, the disabilty benet payroll tax rate is set
to zero, and the pension benet payroll tax rate nances both types of benets.
Due to contribution ceilings, individual pension, disability, and health-insurance payroll-
tax rates can dier from the average payroll tax rate. Above the contribution ceiling,
marginal social security contributions are zero and average social security contributions
fall with the agent's income. To accommodate this non-convexity in the budget con-
straint, we assume that the highest earnings class in each region pays pension payroll
taxes and, in the EMU, NEA, China and India, health-insurance payroll taxes, up to the
relevant ceilings, but face no payroll taxation at the margin. The other earnings classes
are assumed to face the full statutory tax rate on all their earnings. The disability payroll
9taxes in the U.S., the EMU and NEA are modeled in an equivalent manner. However,
since there is no ceiling on U.S. Medicare taxes, all skill groups in the U.S. face the
health-insurance payroll tax at the margin.
If a k-skill class agent, whose parents were s years old at his birth, retired in year i at
the exogenously set retirement age  a(i), her pension benet Pen(a;t;s;k) in year t  i
when she is age a   a(i) is assumed to depend linearly on her average earnings during
her working life  W(i;s;k):
Pen(a;t;s;k) = 0 + 1   W(i;s;k): (22)
The region-specic parameters 0;1 for the U.S., the EMU and NEA were chosen to
match replacement rates reported in OECD (2007c). In China and India, only a fraction
of public employees are covered by the public pension system. But spending on civil
service pensions in China and India amounts to 2-3 percent of GDP (see James 2002
and World Bank 2005). Since we cannot distinguish between covered and non-covered
employment in our model, we assume a pension-replacement rate of 40 percent of average
pre-retirement earnings. The rate is far too low for covered employees and far too high
for non-covered employees, but it results in realistic aggregate pension expenditures in
the two countries.
General government expenditures q(6;t)C(6;t) consist of government purchases of goods
and services, including educational expenditures and health outlays. Over the transition,
the ratio of general government purchases of goods and services to GDP is held xed.
Age-specic per-capita education and disability outlays are assumed to grow with GDP
per capita over the transition.
Age-specic health outlays per capita also grow with GDP per capita. However, in the
U.S., EMU, and Japan we assume an additional growth rate of 2.0 percent per year
during the rst 20 years of the transition and of 1.0 percent between 2025 and 2035.7
In China and India, age-specic healthcare outlays per capita are assumed to grow at
a faster pace: During the rst 40 years of the transition there is an additional annual
growth rate of four percent. Note that while we treat 80 percent of health benets as
government consumption and 20 percent as fungible transfers to households, disability
benets are modeled exclusively as fungible transfers to households.
During the transition, we keep the ratio of wage-tax to consumption-tax revenue xed
each year and balance the government's annual budget (20) by adjusting the intercept in
our linear equation determining the average wage-tax rate as well as the consumption-tax
rate.
7As shown in Hagist and Kotliko (2009), this is a rather conservative assumption concerning future
growth in benet levels.
105. Computing the Economy's Dynamic Equilibrium
To compute the world economy's perfect-foresight general equilibrium transition path,
we start with initial guesses of the equilibrium factor and product prices of r(t), w(k;t),
q(j;t). We next use these prices to determine consumption demands, C(j;t;z) and sup-
plies of both labor, Ls(k;t;z) and assets, A(t + 1;z) for each year in each region z. We
assume that consumption goods j = 1;2 as well as the public good j = 6 are non-traded
goods and that consumption goods j = 3;4 as well as the investment good j = 5 are





C(j;t;z) j = 3;4; (23)




A(t + 1;z)   B(t + 1;z)








where YW(j;t) stands for total worldwide production of good j in year t and z references
a region in the set W = fU.S., EMU, NEA, China, Indiag. Note that world output of the
investment good is the dierence between the world capital stock in t + 1 and t, which,
in turn, is the dierence between world wealth at t + 1 and t:














Factor demands in the non-traded sectors j 2 f1;2;6g in each region z are determined








































YW(j;t) referencing labor of skill type k per unit of output of good j, in
year t, K(j;t) =
K(j;t)
YW(j;t) referencing capital per unit of output of good j, in year t, and
~ Ls
W(k;t) and ~ AW(t) referencing, respectively, the world-wide excess supplies of labor and
capital available for productive use in the traded sectors given the world-wide demands
for these factors to produce non-traded goods. The second equalities in the above two
equations state that the excess supplies of inputs available to produce traded goods must
equal their respective world-wide demands by traded goods producers.
Substituting (19) into (29) and (18) into (30) leads to the capital and labor input-output





















The producer price of the investment good is normalized to unity, i.e. q(5;t) = 1:0.
This permits us to calculate the value of  from the rst-order condition for wage rates
(equation (19)) so that the wage rate of U.S. unskilled workers is normalized to unity in
the rst period.









In order to derive producer prices q(j;t) for private and public consumption goods we rst
compute the respective capital and labor input-output coecients, K(j;t) and L(k;j;t).
Substituting the two rst-order conditions (18) and (19) into the per-unit demand func-
































12The new producer prices for goods j 2 f1;2;3;4;6g are now computed from




which measures the unit cost of production as the product of input prices and their usage
per unit of output.
We next use the factor input-output ratios and the total output of traded goods to allocate
production to the dierent regions. Doing so lets us determine the regional pattern of net
exports. Our procedure is to rst derive, for each year t and every productivity level k,
the excess labor supply ~ Ls(k;t;z) in region z available for use in traded goods. We then
relate these excess labor supplies to their respective excess labor demands; in so doing,
we arrive at three equations in three unknowns, which we use to determine the share of
worldwide production of each of the traded goods that occurs in region z.
Equation (38) below states that traded-goods excess labor supplies of each skill type at
time t in region z (the right-hand side of the equation) equals the sum over the three
traded goods of the product of three variables { the input-output coecient for the type
of labor and traded good being considered, the world-wide supply of that traded good,






























Equation (38) represents three equations in the three unknowns Y(3;t;z), Y(4;t;z),
and Y(5;t;z). Given values of these three variables, we can determine factor inputs in
the traded goods sectors from
L(k;j;t;z) = Y(j;t;z)L(k;j;t)YW(j;t) and (39)
K(j;t;z) = Y(j;t;z)K(j;t)YW(j;t): j 2 f3;4;5g (40)
Note that nothing precludes our calculating negative values for the Y(j;t;z)s. Negative
values are, of course, infeasible and indicative of specialization. Recall that our model
features three immobile factors of production (the three labor skill groups), one mobile
factor (capital), and three traded goods. These elements suce for non-specialization
and factor-price equalization, but they don't guarantee this outcome. As in the standard
2 by 2 trade model, if relative factor endowments are suciently distinct (e.g., one region
has zero supply of a particular factor), specialization will arise and factor prices will not
13be equalized.
In our model, which features exogenous net immigration, we could modify our assumed
skill-specic time paths of net immigration to restore factor prize equalization were it
otherwise fail to arise. But making such assumptions would be at odds with prevailing
immigration policy. An alternative and, actually, highly realistic way to restore, where
needed, factor price equalization via factor mobility is to take into account the fact
that domestic rms are now routinely employing oshore labor (e.g., software engineers,
customer support representatives, telephone salespeople) to participate in their domestic
productive processes via the internet and telephone. Such foreign employees are, in
fact, working with the domestic rm's domestic employees as well as domestic capital in
producing domestic output.
To accommodate this economic reality, we set up the following iteration. We set any
negative output shares computed via equation (38) to zero and compute, using the re-
maining positive output shares, an updated and, of course, higher labor demand for each
skill level in each region z . The dierence, for each skill group, between total excess labor
demand and total excess labor supply in the traded goods sector of region z is assumed to
be acquired via oshore hires. We secure this skill-specic oshore labor by reducing the
excess labor supplies for that skill group across the other four regions. The region-specic
reductions are allocated in proportion to each of the relevant regions' shares of worldwide
labor supply of the skill group in question. Given this resulting modication of excess
labor supplies in the traded goods sector in each region, we then recalculate the output
shares Y(j;t;z) and continue iterating in this fashion until all output shares are either
positive or zero.
Clearly, other assumptions about the locus of oshore labor hires would result in dierent
region-specic loci of world production. But they would not change the world (ve-region)
equilibrium transition path. This is just Rybczynski's Theorem (1955) in action; with
complete factor mobility, one can't say anything about where products will be produced,
although one can say everything about what will be produced and who will get paid
what for that production. Of course, the world does not feature complete factor mobility.
Our assumption is that the world (our ve regions) has only enough factor mobility,
including the hiring of labor oshore, to achieve factor-price equalization. We believe
our assumption about where the oshore labor is located is reasonable and that the
resulting region-specic GDPs, which rely (positively and negatively) on oshore labor,
are realistic.
Our algorithm iterates until the time paths of interest and wage rates converge to a xed
point and supplies for each good equals its demand. We give our economy 300 years to
reach to a steady state. In fact, our model reaches a steady state to many decimal places




This section describes our data set for the benchmark population in the year 2000 and
the transition.8 The main data source for our population data is the medium variant of
the United Nations population projections (UNPD, 2007). In the case of Taiwan we had
to rely on national population statistics provided by the Statistical Oce (CEPD, 2007).
However, part of the raw data was only supplied in aggregates. In addition, the specic
structure of our population model imposed certain restrictions on our data set.
To specify the current and future demographic structure of each region we start with year-
2000 age-specic population [N(a;2000)] and age-specic net-immigration [NM(a;2000)]
counts. In constructing existing as well as future age-population counts, we have to link
each initial cohort between the ages of 1 and 68 to those of their parents who are still
alive. The reason is that children receive bequests from their parents, and the levels and
timing of these inheritances depend on the ages of their parents. This linkage is achieved
by applying past fertility rates to each cohort under age 69 in year 2000. If, for example,
15 percent of the parents of newborns in 1980 were 25 years old, then 15 percent of the
20-year-old's in year 2000 are assigned to parents age 45.
In addition, each cohort is split into three skill classes k. According to the latest gures
on educational attainment from the U.S. Census Bureau (2008), 15 percent of each cohort
belong to the lowest skill class, 30 percent to the top skill class, and the remaining 55
percent to the middle skill class in the U.S., EMU and NEA. Since there are no available
data detailing educational attainment in China and India, we assume that 22 percent
of the overall population belong to the lowest, 25 percent to the top skill class, and 53
percent to the middle.9
To determine the evolution of the population in each region over time, we applied region-,
age-, and year-specic mortality and fertility rates to the cohorts alive in year 2000 as
well as to their children as they reach their ages of fertility and mortality. In the baseline
path the exogenous current and future mortality and fertility rates follow the medium
variant of the United Nations population projection (UNPD, 2007) for the U.S., EMU,
NEA, China and India.
According to this projection, mortality rates will decline in all regions over time. Consider
Northeast Asia whose 2005 life expectancy at birth equaled 81.2. According to ocial
8Although the economic model starts in year 2005, we chose year 2000 as the initial year for the
population projections due to data availability.
9This assumption may well understate the relative number of unskilled workers in the two countries.
15projections, NEA's life expectancy in 2050 will reach 86.7. Due to the high life expectancy
of Japan, NEA's citizens now have a 3 year higher life expectancy than Americans and a
1.5 higher life expectancy than EMU citizens. In China, life expectancy is now 8.3 years
lower than in Japan. In India it is 16.5 years lower. According to the UN projections,
NEA countries will continue to maintain their longevity lead through time. Only India
will reduce the gap signicantly to 11.1 years in the next half decade. Table 1 shows our
agent's life expectancies at birth in the baseline path, which is kept constant after year
2050. The respective numbers are higher than the actual values, since our model's agents
don't die prior to age 68.
Total fertility rates currently equal 2.05, 1.5, 1.53, 1.73 and 2.8 in the U.S., EMU, NEA,
China, and India, respectively. Nevertheless the United Nations expects fertility rates in
all regions to converge to 1.85 children by 2050.10 This path of fertility rates is also shown
in Table 1. In the baseline path, we assume annual net immigration of 1 million per year
in the U.S., 450,000 in the EMU, and 54,000 in NEA. Net immigration into China and
India is negative. In accordance with UN projections, the number of net emigrants is
xed at its current value of 390,000 people per year in China and 280,000 people in India.
Given the population age structure in year 2000 as well as projected future fertility,
mortality, and net immigration rates, we compute the population vector N(a;t;s;k)
for the years t between 2001 and 2050. After year 2050, fertility rates are endogenously
adjusted in line with zero population growth and a stable population age structure. Since
the net immigration rate is positive in the U.S., the EMU, and NEA, the population-
stabilizing post-2050 fertility rates are below 2.0. Equivalently, the fertility rates in China
and India are set above 2.0 after 2050 due to positive net emigration rates.
Table 1 also shows projected changes over time in total populations and population age
structures. Due to high fertility and net immigration, the U.S. population is projected
to increase from 293 million in 2005 to 445 million in 2100. In the EMU, the population
falls over the century from 309 to 288 million. In Northeast Asia, the population falls
from 204 million to 130 million. The Chinese population decreases by even more { from
roughly 1.30 billion to 1.15 billion. In contrast, the population in India increases from
1.13 billion in 2005 to 1.5 billion in 2100; i.e., India becomes the most populous country
in the world.
As one would expect, the population share of those 65 and older increases in all ve re-
gions. There are, however, major dierences in the aging process across the regions. First,
whereas the share of the working-age population increases in India until 2050, it decreases
modestly in the U.S., but more substantially in the EMU, China and NEA. Second, the
share of elderly increases to a much larger extent in Japan and China compared to India,
10The dierent projection in NEA is due to Taiwan which assumes a dierent fertility pattern in the
future.
16the EMU, and the U.S. Table 1 indicates that our model's demographic machinery does
a remarkably good job matching ocial projections for the ve regions both with respect
to the absolute number and age compositions of their respective populations.
Table 1: Comparing Actual and Simulated Population Projections
Country U.S. EMU NEA China India
Year 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050
Fertility Rate
Model 2.08 1.85 1.49 1.82 1.53 1.75 1.64 1.85 2.99 1.85
Ocial 2.05 1.85 1.50 1.85 1.53 1.73 1.73 1.85 2.81 1.85
Life Expectancy at Birth
Model 81.9 83.8 82.4 84.6 84.2 87.3 76.2 80.2 63.9 75.3
Ocial 78.2 73.1 79.7 84.3 81.2 86.7 73.0 79.3 64.7 75.6
Total Population (in Millions)
Model 293.9 403.6 309.5 308.3 205.4 181.4 1228.1 1401.5 1129.9 1643.9
Ocial 299.8 402.4 312.2 312.9 205.6 172.6 1313.0 1408.8 1134.4 1658.3
Age Structure (in Percent of total Population)
0-15 Years
Model 20.7 17.8 16.1 15.0 14.6 13.7 21.6 16.3 33.2 18.2
Ocial 20.8 17.3 15.6 14.5 15.5 10.7 21.6 15.3 33.0 18.2
15-64 Years
Model 67.2 62.0 67.1 57.5 65.8 53.1 71.8 61.6 62.4 66.1
Ocial 66.9 61.7 66.8 55.9 68.5 52.6 70.7 61.0 62.0 67.3
65-90 Years
Model 12.1 20.1 16.8 27.5 19.5 33.2 6.6 22.0 4.4 15.7
Ocial 12.3 21.0 17.6 29.6 16.0 36.7 7.7 23.7 5.0 14.5
2. Specifying Our Six Products
Our aggregation of goods into four consumption goods (services, housing, low tech, and
high tech), an investment good, and a public good and is based on the March 2007
release of the EU-KLEMS database11. This database reports the total values of capital
11See Timmer et al. (2007). Services includes distribution and personal services. Housing includes
construction and real estate activities. Low-tech consumption includes consumer manufacturing, agri-
culture, hunting, forestry, and shing. High-tech consumption includes electrical and optical equipment,
wood products, coke, petroleum, and nuclear fuel products, mining, electricity, gas, and water supply,
post and telecommunications, and nance and business. Investment includes machinery, transport equip-
ment, chemical products, rubber and plastic products, non-metallic mineral products, and basic metals
and fabricated metal products. Public goods includes public administration, education, and health.
17and labor inputs for 26 dierent production sectors as well as the shares of high-skilled,
medium-skilled and low-skilled labor in total labor inputs. The annual data base covers
most OECD countries as well as various country groups during the period 1970-2004.
Given this sectoral aggregation, we computed the capital income shares as well as the
skill-specic labor shares from the 2004 (SIC based) U.S. data as reported in Table 2.
As one would expect, capital income shares are especially high in the housing sector;
they are especially low in the private service and public goods sectors. Note that with
the exception of housing our capital shares accord closely with the sector capital shares
reported in Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).12 As indicated in the table, the low-tech
consumption good and housing sectors have the highest shares of low-skilled labor; the
high-tech consumption good sector, the non-housing services sector, and the public good
sector have the highest share of high-skilled labor. Finally, the depreciation rate is set at
the same rate for all countries.
Table 2: Production Technology Parameters
Consumption Good Investment Public
Symbol 1 2 3 4 Good Good
Capital share in production (j) 0.26 0.57 0.44 0.41 0.35 0.26
Share of specic labor inputs (k;j)
Low-skill (k = 1) 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.02
Medium-skill (k = 2) 0.57 0.62 0.58 0.38 0.57 0.39
High-skill (k = 3) 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.59 0.37 0.59
Technology coecient  4.37
Depreciation rate K 0.075
Table 3 reports values of preference and policy parameters. The time-preference rates
in the ve regions were set to match the model's 2005 ratios of private consumption to
GDP to the region-specic values reported in European Commission (2008) for the U.S.,
EMU, and NEA13, European Commission (2007) for China, and OECD (2007e) for In-
dia. The U.S., EMU, and NEA time-preference rates are held xed through time. But
in line with our baseline assumption that the Chinese and Indian public will eventually
adopt developed economies' spending habits, we gradually raise the time preference rate
of successive Chinese and Indian cohorts so that the cohorts that reach adulthood (age
21) in 2030 and thereafter have the same time-invariant time-preference rate as in the
U.S. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the elasticity of substitution between
12Their housing sector is conned to construction, whereas our housing sector is meant to include
imputed rent from housing services.
13Note that all macroeconomic values for NEA are compared to ocial data reported for Japan.
18consumption and leisure, and the leisure preference parameters are taken from Kotliko,
Smetters, and Walliser (2007). The elasticity of substitution between consumption goods
was chosen to generate a pattern of demand that accords with U.S. consumption data.
The age-specic weights of the dierent consumption goods in the utility function are
derived from U.S. Department of Labor (2007), where we aggregated the dierent con-
sumption goods reported there according to our table 2 classication. Note that the
consumption shares vary signicantly with age, with housing's share rising considerably
with age.
Table 3: Preference, Productivity and Policy Parameters
Symbol U.S. EMU NEA China India
Time preference rate  0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.04
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
 0.25
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution
-between consumption and leisure  0.4
-between consumption goods ! 1.1
Leisure preference parameter " 1.5
Consumption shares of goods j (j;a) 1 2 3 4
a < 25 0.04 0.36 0.19 0.41
25  a  34 0.06 0.40 0.17 0.37
35  a  44 0.07 0.40 0.18 0.35
45  a  54 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.37
55  a  64 0.11 0.38 0.17 0.34
65  a  74 0.16 0.38 0.16 0.30
a  75 0.21 0.40 0.15 0.24
Shift parameter for productivity  1.00 0.65 0.50 0.018 0.01
Technical progress  0.01
Capital tax rate (in %) r 11.0 14.0 8.0 3.0 3.0
Debt (in % of national income) B=Y 43.4 50.3 70.0 23.5 60.0
Age of retirement  a 63 60 60 60 60
We normalize the labor productivity parameter {  { at 1 for the U.S. and set the initial
values of this parameter for the other four regions to match the 2005 relative values of
GDP. In the non-U.S. region, this parameter is gradually raised to 1.0 (the U.S. value)
for each successive cohort of new worker cohorts. For the EMU and NEA we assume this
adjustments occurs over the 10 years between 2005 and 2015. For China we assume it
takes 15 years. And for India, we assume 75 years. This assumption concerning India
is in line with Bosworth and Collins (2008) who found that during the last four decades
India made little progress in increasing even elementary educational attainment. Once
this phase-in period is complete, it takes another 40 years until all cohorts of workers in
19the non-U.S. regions have the same value, namely 1, of  entering in the determination
of their labor productivity as determined by (11).
It may be useful, at this point, to point out that there are ve dierent factors involved
in the determination of a worker's total labor earnings in a given year. The rst is
the worker's eective time endowment, which, as indicated above, depends on when the
worker is born and on the rate of technical change. The second is the share of the worker's
eective time endowment that she chooses to allocate to working, rather than to leisure.
The third is the labor-productivity coecient, , just mentioned. The fourth is the
remaining elements in (11), which capture how productivity changes with the worker's
age and, therefore, depend on the worker's age. And the fth is the equilibrium wage
rate per eective unit of labor supply for the worker's skill group.
The model's debt-to-GDP levels were set based on OECD (2007a) reports of net govern-
ment liabilties for the U.S., EMU, and NEA, an OECD (2005) report of gross debt for
China, and an IMF (2005) report of gross debt for India. During the transition debt-
to-GDP ratios are assumed to remain unchanged. The maximum ages of retirement are
taken from OECD (2006a) for the U.S. and EMU and from SSA (2007) for NEA, China,
and India. We calibrated the endogenous consumption and wage tax rates and set the
personal capital income tax rates in order to yield the structure of indirect and direct
tax revenues reported in European Commission (2008) for the U.S., the EMU, and NEA
and in OECD (2002) and Poirson (2006) for China and India. Our wage tax systems
are assumed to be progressive, with the parameters of each region's tax system set to
generate what appears to be realistic average and marginal tax rates.
In calibrating health expenditures in our model, we apply the Japanese age-specic gov-
ernment healthcare expenditure prole for NEA as well as China and India. In the case
of the EMU, we use the German prole. For the U.S. our prole comes from Hagist and
Kotliko (2009). We assume uniform disability expenditures by age for ages between 21
and 64 in the U.S., the EMU, and NEA. We don't model separate disability programs for
China and India. In the case of the U.S., EMU, and NEA, total social insurance outlays
for pensions, disability, and health, measured as a share of GDP are set to accord with
the values reported in OECD (2007b, c, d). In calibrating social security contribution
rates, we assume that 75 percent of overall healthcare benets in the U.S. and 25 percent
in NEA are nanced by general taxes. In the EMU, we assume that 20 percent of the
outlays of all three social security systems (health, pension, disability) are nanced by
general taxes. Note that our baseline path assumes a gradual 20 percent cut in NEA
pension replacement rates through 2017 in accord with recent pension reforms in Japan.
For China our division of social insurance outlays is restricted to pensions plus disability
payments; for India we assume that social insurance outlays are spent soley on health
expenditures. Calibration of social insurance outlays here is based on OECD (2005) for
20China. Since data on India were not available we assumed the same values as for China.
We use the German age-specic education prole (due to data availability) for all regions
in the model and rescale it to get realistic education outlays in year 2005 in each region (see
below). In addition to these parameter values, our model requires an initial distribution
of assets by age and income class for each region. These proles are region-specic and
were adopted from a steady-state run of our simulation model.
IV. Findings
1. Initial equilibrium and baseline path
This section reports our baseline transition path ndings. We start in Table 4 by com-
paring simulated with observed 2005 macro variables. The ocial GDP gures presented
on the right side of Table 4 come from European Commission (2007, 2008), and, for
India, OECD (2007e). The model's values for consumption, government purchases, and
investment come very close to their ocial counterparts. Note especially that our model
matches the very high rate of private consumption in the U.S. and very high rates of
domestic investment in China and India. The model also does very well in matching
relative GDP levels as reported by the World Bank (2007). The disaggregation of public
goods is based, in part, on OECD (2005, 2006b) data on education outlays and, in part,
on the aforementioned assumption that 80 percent of government health expenditures is
government consumption. General public expenditures is calculated as a residual.
Our model's trade balances agree in sign, but not value, with actual values. But given that
our model excludes regions outside of our ve, one should probably not expect too much
concurrence with respect to trade balances or current accounts. As already explained
above, outlays of the social security systems were calibrated to yield the ocial values
from OECD (2007b, c, d). The ocial contribution rates for pensions, health-care and
disability were taken from SSA (2006) for the U.S. and from SSA (2007) for NEA (Japan),
China and India.14 Obviously, our pension and health insurance contribution rates in
China and India deviate from ocial gures. Our model assumes that all households in
all regions are covered by the government's pension system whereas only about 23 percent
of the total workforce in China and India are so covered. (Deutsche Bank Research, 2006).
Table 5 reports the baseline path of GDP for the ve regions as well as the evolution
of domestic capital stocks, labor demands, and average eective wage tax rates. All
indexes for the ve regions are expressed relative to year-2005 values in the U.S. The
rst point of interest is the growth of the U.S. economy relative to the EMU and NEA
economies. U.S. GDP expands by a factor of 4.6 over the century, whereas EMU GDP
14The ocial tax revenue data come from European Commission (2008) for U.S., EMU and NEA












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 5: Country-Specic Simulation Results of the Baseline Path
Eective Pay- Average Consump-
Capital Labor Demand Wage roll Wage tion
Year GDP Stock Low Middle High Taxa Taxa Taxa Taxa;b
U.S.
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 38.9 15.5 13.4 11.1
2010 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.11 40.6 16.5 13.8 11.5
2030 1.63 1.71 1.60 1.56 1.65 55.0 24.6 17.2 15.2
2050 2.76 3.08 2.79 2.54 2.65 62.1 22.6 19.6 24.8
2100 4.61 4.55 5.11 4.56 4.67 68.7 28.4 20.3 25.0
EMU
2005 0.86 0.83 0.73 0.83 0.97 58.0 27.5 11.9 22.9
2010 0.91 0.89 0.77 0.87 1.03 60.1 29.7 11.9 22.7
2030 1.30 1.33 1.14 1.19 1.43 72.5 40.1 12.4 25.0
2050 1.96 2.17 1.81 1.73 2.01 79.3 39.7 13.3 35.7
2100 3.01 2.93 3.06 2.87 3.23 80.3 39.9 14.0 35.9
NEA
2005 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.53 58.4 27.0 14.3 20.7
2010 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.46 0.54 62.0 31.5 14.3 19.4
2030 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.71 0.77 67.6 35.6 14.3 21.5
2050 1.02 1.13 1.04 0.95 0.99 72.0 36.2 15.0 26.3
2100 1.31 1.30 1.51 1.30 1.30 69.6 35.5 16.1 22.0
China
2005 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20 33.4 6.7 4.0 29.4
2010 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.42 29.8 5.9 3.1 26.3
2030 2.96 3.21 3.72 2.85 2.71 25.7 5.4 3.6 20.0
2050 5.27 6.57 7.81 4.83 4.04 26.7 11.4 3.5 13.4
2100 8.88 9.61 13.38 8.71 7.54 41.2 23.9 4.0 15.4
India
2005 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 26.1 6.1 4.0 19.1
2010 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 20.4 5.4 2.5 14.3
2030 1.29 1.39 1.40 1.21 1.25 22.9 4.6 3.1 18.0
2050 4.12 4.86 4.71 3.76 3.67 28.5 8.5 3.3 20.0
2100 11.04 11.92 16.32 10.82 9.43 39.8 20.6 4.2 17.7
a In percent; b These are nominal (tax exclusive) rates. The tax inclusive consumption tax
rate (the nominal divided by 1 plus the nominal rate) is used in forming eective wage tax rates.
expands by a factor of only 3.5, and NEA GDP expands by a factor of only 2.8. These
dierences re
ects, in large part, demographic dierences across the regions, particularly
the absolute population decline in NEA.
China's GDP, in contrast, starts at 19 percent of the U.S. value, but overtakes the U.S.
by 2020. But once China's productivity levels reach U.S. values, its growth slows. Conse-
24quently, by 2100, China's GDP is only 1.9 times the U.S. level. The results for India are
also quite interesting. Thanks to India's slower productivity growth, its growth explosion
occurs in the second half of the century. But by century's end, India's GDP is 2.4 times
U.S. GDP and 1.2 times China's. Together, China and India account for 4.3 times U.S.
GDP in 2100, and U.S. GDP, which accounts for 38.5 percent of total 5-region GDP in
2005, accounts for only 16.0 percent in 2100. In short, the U.S. becomes a small player
in the developed world.
The growth of output can be explained, in part, by the growth of inputs. Table 5 shows
that the capital stock in each region grows almost in lockstep with GDP in each region.
Equilibrium labor demand (and supply) rise both because of technical progress (the
expansion of eective time available to successive cohorts) and changes in labor supply.
In the other regions, this growth also re
ects changes in labor productivity as successive
new cohorts of workers gradually attain U.S. productivity levels. The key points of
interest in Table 5 are the very rapid expansions of labor supply in China between 2005
and 2030 and in India between 2050 and 2100.
Table 6 examines how components of GDP evolve in the ve regions. Over the rst 25
years, the U.S. runs sizeable annual trade decits as it imports capital from China, whose
very high saving rate leads to considerable asset accumulation and large trade surpluses.
Ultimately, the returns from these investments in the U.S. must be repatriated, which
explains why the U.S. runs such large trade surpluses toward the end of the century and
why China runs such large trade decits. We can see this clearly in the patterns of wealth
accumulation and capital usage in the U.S. and China over time. In 2100 capital employed
in the U.S. exceeds U.S. national wealth by a factor of two. In China, national wealth
exceeds capital employed by one quarter. The EMU also ends up with a 2100 capital
stock that is twice as large as its national wealth; i.e., if all it wealth were invested at
home, citizens of the EMU would own only half of the region's total capital stock in 2100.
In contrast to China, India uses much more capital than it owns until the very end of
the century. In NEA there is a relatively close balance between employed capital and
owned capital over the period. The table shows that trade and current account decits
can be very sizeable for decades before they reverse their sign and that their pattern is
not easily forecast. I.e., there are a host of complex, interconnected factors determining
their time paths including inter-regional dierences in saving behavior, demographics,
and scal policies.
Consider next how average eective wage tax rates evolve. As indicated in Table 5, this
tax rate comprises the payroll tax rate, the average wage (labor income) tax rate, and
the average consumption tax rate.15 All ve regions experience dramatic increases over
15Consumption tax rates are expressed here on a tax inclusive basis to make it comparable to payroll
and wage tax rates.
25Table 6: GDP and Its Components in the Baseline Path
Consump- Invest- Gov. Pur- Trade Current
tion ment chases Balance Account National
Year /GDPa /GDPa /GDPa /GDPa /GDPa Wealthb
U.S. 2005 70.6 21.2 15.8 -7.6 0.1 1.30
2010 70.3 17.6 16.1 -4.0 4.1 1.46
2030 66.3 22.7 20.4 -9.4 -7.8 1.81
2050 45.5 22.1 21.4 11.1 -2.5 1.09
2100 46.7 17.3 21.4 14.5 2.7 2.25
EMU 2005 57.7 19.1 20.5 2.7 0.0 0.74
2010 58.5 16.4 20.9 4.1 2.5 0.83
2030 54.2 21.4 24.4 0.0 -4.7 1.06
2050 40.7 20.4 26.2 12.6 -1.1 0.72
2100 42.2 17.1 26.1 14.5 3.0 1.46
NEA 2005 57.4 17.7 18.1 6.8 4.1 0.40
2010 61.2 15.5 18.9 4.4 5.0 0.48
2030 53.8 21.0 22.7 2.4 -0.6 0.65
2050 46.0 20.2 24.9 8.8 1.6 0.72
2100 57.1 17.1 24.5 1.4 5.7 1.54
China 2005 39.1 35.0 13.9 11.9 -4.2 0.06
2010 34.0 53.6 13.5 -1.0 -14.5 0.18
2030 52.5 29.1 14.2 4.0 13.7 4.47
2050 76.2 26.2 16.3 -18.7 6.7 13.71
2100 75.5 18.8 16.6 -10.8 -2.8 12.66
India 2005 58.6 32.5 11.5 -2.6 -16.2 0.04
2010 50.0 46.2 11.4 -7.6 -25.1 0.04
2030 51.4 35.9 11.5 1.2 -16.5 0.38
2050 50.1 28.7 12.9 8.3 -6.8 1.54
2100 68.4 19.7 13.4 -1.5 -0.4 12.40
a In percent; b National wealth is dened as private assets minus government debt.
time in tax rates. In the U.S., average eective wage tax rates rise from 38.9 percent
in 2005 to 68.7 percent in 2100. This is a larger percentage increase than in the EMU,
which starts with a 58.0 percent average rate and ends up in 2100 with an 80.3 percent
average rate! In NEA, the average eective wage tax rate rises from 58.4 percent to 69.6
percent.
These are startlingly high tax rates in the case of the three developed regions. Do they
make sense? They do given two factors. First, all three regions have very signicant
pay-go social insurance programs whose benets are disproportionately distributed to
the elderly. Given the dramatic aging (see table 1) now underway, one would expect
major tax hikes simply to nance these benets. Second, healthcare benet levels have
26risen and can be expected to continue to rise much faster than per capita GDP in each
of the three regions. Recall that we are assuming for the U.S., EMU, and NEA a growth
rate in healthcare benet levels that is two percentage points higher than the growth rate
of per capita GDP for the rst 20 years of the transition and one percentage point higher
for the following 10 years. As indicated in Hagist and Kotliko (2009), this is actually a
rather conservative assumption. In the U.S., for example, the 1970-2002 average annual
growth rate of real government healthcare benet exceeded the average annual growth
rate of per capita GDP by 2.6 percentage points. Since 2002, the dierential appears to
have been much larger thanks to the introduction of Medicare Part D prescription drug
benets and a huge expansion of Medicaid coverage.
Tax rates in both China and India also end up much higher at the end of the century, but
before then they fall considerably, in the case of China, and moderately, in the case of
India. The explanation is the expansion of the labor income of younger generations thanks
to our assumptions concerning cohort-specic labor-productivity increases. Over time, as
the entire labor force becomes fully productive and as these fully productive generations
retire, their higher earnings histories translate into higher old age healthcare and pension
benets, whose nancing requires higher tax rates. As indicated, we're also assuming a
very sizable growth rate in healthcare benet levels (4 percentage points above the growth
rate of per capita GDP) for the next four decades in these two regions. Our rationale is
that these countries are starting out with very low levels of healthcare benets; and their
governments will face strong pressure from their populations to improve this situation.
Table 5 shows the compositions of the tax rate increases. In the U.S. and EMU they are
coming disproportionately from increases in payroll and consumption tax rates. In NEA,
the major increase is from payroll taxes. This is also the case in China and India, where
long-run average wage tax rates (the rates applied to wages via income taxation) dier
either not at all or very little from their initial values and where long-run consumption tax
rates are lower and, in the case of China, signicantly lower, than their initial values. The
decline in consumption tax rates compared to wage tax rates re
ects the expansion of the
consumption tax base relative to the wage tax base. The explanation lies in a) changes
over time in China's and India's time-preference rates that lead the countries to spend
more and save less and b) the signicant aging of the two countries' populations, which
generates relatively large numbers of elderly whose principal occupation is consuming,
rather than working.
Changes in factor prices are shown in Table 7. As in Fehr, et. al. (2007), the interest rate
decreases through mid-century thanks in large part to China's extremely high propensity
to save. In the second half of the century it increases again, but ends up in 2100 some
120 basis points below the year-2005 value. These real interest rate developments are
interesting; even more interesting is what happens to the levels and distribution of real
27Table 7: Factor Prices in the Baseline Path
Interest Wage Rates
Year Rate Low Middle High
2005 12.7 1.00 2.99 5.83
2010 12.4 0.98 3.03 5.87
2030 10.9 0.84 3.13 6.37
2050 9.1 0.75 3.24 7.16
2100 11.5 0.68 2.97 6.86
 At age 21 per unit of eective time
wage rates.
According to Table 7, low-skilled wages per unit of eective time decrease continuously
during the century. By mid-century the level of wages for low-skilled workers is only 75
percent of the year-2005 level; in 2100 it is only 68 percent of the initial level. Wages per
unit of eective time for medium-skilled workers remain almost unchanged during the
transition. In contrast, the wage rate of high-skilled workers per unit of eective time
increases through mid-century; in 2050, it is 23 percent above its initial value. After
2050, the high-skilled wage rate falls, stabilizing in 2075 at 18 percent above the 2005
level. Wage-skill dierentials in the medium and long runs are much larger than those
that now exist. In 2005 the high-skilled wage rate exceeds the low-skilled rate by a factor
of 5.83. By 2050 this factor is 9.5. In 2100 the factor is 10.1!
Producer prices remain almost constant during the transition; i.e., we see major changes
in relative factor rewards with only minor changes in relative producer prices. Producer
prices can be traced to unit costs, but when relative factor prices change, unit costs need
change very little as the costs of some factors rise and other fall. In addition, substitution
away from relatively expensive factors limits changes in producer prices.
Our model generates signicant changes in the region-specic structure of production
during the transition. In all regions investment good production increases during the
rst half of the century and decreases afterwards. Production of the low-tech good is
completely eliminated in the developed regions in the medium and long run. Interestingly,
the high-tech good sector (good 4) is reduced in China in the short run, but increases
again in the long run. In contrast, public good production increases in all regions during
the transition. Finally, the service sector (good 1) declines somewhat in the developed
regions and expands in the developing regions. Our model also generates an increasing
demand for services over time, whereas the demand for the traded low-tech and high-tech
good decreases slightly in all regions. These developments re
ect the changing demands
of aging populations due to the specic age-dependent consumption shares assumed for
28the dierent consumption goods.
Over time, the developed regions as well as India after 2030 become major importers of the
low-tech consumption good (good 3) while China becomes the world's primary exporter
of this good. The opposite holds for the high-tech good which is mainly imported by
China and exported by the U.S. (second half of the century), EMU and India. China and
India are the main importers of the investment good while this good is exported by the
developed regions. Finally, all three developed regions become increasingly dependent
over time on o-shore low-skilled labor. By the end of the century between one fth and
one quarter of the developed regions' low-skilled labor forces are hired o shore.
2. Alternative Policies
We explore next how shutting down trade with China and India would aect the developed
regions. We consider this case by simply excluding India and China from our simulation
model. The calibration of the remaining regions remains unchanged. Table 8 reports
macroeconomic variables. Note that we express all indexes relative to the U.S. year-2005
levels of the baseline path.
As the table indicates, excluding China and India has dramatic eects on the economic
development in the developed regions. Capital stocks in all three regions in the initial
years of the transition are higher compared to the ve-region case since more capital now
remains in the developed world. For example, in 2020 the capital stock index in the U.S.
is 1.46 compared to 1.27 in the ve-region simulation (see Table 5). However, in all three
regions, capital stocks as well as levels of GDP grow to a much smaller extent over time
compared with the baseline. These developments are also re
ected in the path for payroll
tax rates. These rates increase to a larger extent in the medium run. In the short and
long run they are below their respective baseline values.
The most interesting nding of excluding China and India is its impact on the wage
structure, see Table 9. As before, wage rates for low-skilled workers decrease during the
transition but to a much smaller extent than in the baseline. By the end of the century,
the low-skilled wage rate is 95 percent of the year-2005 level; it was 68 percent of the
year-2005 level in the base case. The reason, of course, is that absent China and India
there is no major increase over time in the relative world supply of low-skilled workers.
Wages for middle-skilled workers are largely unchanged, but the high-skilled wage rate
ends up 2.5 percent below its 2005 level compared to 18 percent above its 2005 level when
China and India are included.
Developed world long-run GDPs are also signicantly aected by moving to autarky with
respect to China and India. For example, U.S. GDP in 2100 is reduced by 14 percent.
Total developed region GDP is reduced by 17 percent. These reductions in GDP suggest























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 9: Factor Prices in Alternative Policy Paths
Interest Wage Rates
Policy Year Rate Low Middle High
Eliminating 2005 11.9 1.05 3.04 5.96
Trade with 2010 11.5 1.06 3.08 6.02
China and 2030 11.7 1.04 3.08 5.95
India 2050 12.7 0.99 2.98 5.87
2100 12.8 1.00 2.98 5.81
Dierent 2005 12.6 1.00 2.99 5.84
Growth of 2010 12.1 1.01 3.05 5.91
Labor 2030 12.3 0.90 3.03 5.98
Productivity 2050 11.8 0.77 3.01 6.43
in China 2100 11.2 0.68 2.99 6.93
Limited 2005 12.6 1.00 2.99 5.85
Growth of 2010 12.5 0.98 3.02 5.85
Healthcare 2030 11.0 0.85 3.14 6.33
Benets 2050 8.9 0.77 3.27 7.18
2100 10.8 0.70 3.04 6.97
Adjusting 2005 12.7 1.00 2.99 5.82
Income 2010 12.4 0.99 3.03 5.84
Class 2030 11.0 0.96 3.16 6.12
Shares 2050 9.2 1.00 3.31 6.61
2100 11.5 1.05 3.09 6.02
 At age 21 per unit of eective time.
were the developed countries to adopt the right redistribution policies. Exploring such
policies is on our agenda for the next draft of this paper.
To assess the sensitivity of our results to our labor productivity assumptions, we ran
two further simulations. The rst assumes that the labor productivity of successive new
cohorts of workers in China increases to the developed world's level in 25 years instead
of 15 years. The second run assumes an adjustment over 50 years. Since the qualitative
results of these two simulation runs were very similar, with much slower economic growth
in China in the short and medium runs than in the baseline path. For example, China's
2030 GDP is now only 47 percent of its baseline level. Slower growth in China means
a smaller supply of Chinese saving to the rest of the world. This, in turn, means lower
rates of domestic investment and slower rates of growth in the other four regions. This
translates into higher payroll and other tax rates and less growth in real wage rates,
particularly among high-skilled workers (see Table 9).
Our next exercise shows how preventing government healthcare benets from growing over
31the next decades at higher rates than per capita GDP would aect the global equilibrium
and, most importantly, region-specic tax rates. The key dierences here are with respect
to long-run tax rates. As shown in Table 10, the U.S. long-run average eective wage
tax rate is now 58.4 percent, rather than 68.7 percent. In the EMU, it's 69.5 percent,
not 80.3 percent. The NEA rate ends ups at 59.2 percent, compared to 69.6 percent.
China's rate in 2100 is 34.3 percent, not 41.2 percent. And India's rate is 32.7 percent,
rather than 39.8 percent. Interestingly, the lower tax rates don't manifest themselves in
higher GDPs. The reason is income eects on labor supply; agents in our model respond
to their tax cuts by consuming more leisure, not working harder, which leaves aggregate
output little changed from the baseline case.
Finally, we simulated successful education policy in China and India by which we mean
that over the next 30 years the two countries succeed in providing new cohorts with the
same distribution of skills as is the case for new cohorts in the developed economies.16
Recall that in 2005, we assume that 22 percent of the overall population in China and
India belong to the low-skill group, 25 percent to the highest, and 53 percent to the
middle. By 2035, these shares have converged to 15, 55, and 30 percent, respectively.
Simulating this policy generates little dierence in overall macroeconomic conditions (see
Table 11). The main eect is on relative GDPs. Year-2100 GDPs in the developed
regions are about 8 percent smaller, while they are about 10 percent larger in China and
India. The real impact of the policy is on wages. As shown in Table 9, the wage rates
per eciency unit of all three skill classes now ultimately increase and wage inequality
remains roughly constant over time. Rather than falling to .68 in 2100, the low-skilled
wage is now 1.05 at Century's end. This improvement in low-skilled wage rates comes
at the price of a wage-rate reduction for high-skilled workers. In 2100 their wage rate is
now 6.02 compared with 6.86 in the base case. As for inequality, the base-case ratio of
high-skilled to low-skilled wage rates in 2100 was 10.1. It's now 5.7. The middle-skilled
workers also experience some improvement in their relative remuneration. Their long-run
wage rate is now 3.09 compared with 2.97 in the base case.
V. Conclusions
This paper developed a new 5-region, dynamic, general equilibrium, life-cycle model to
analyze the impact of globalization on the world's demographic/scal transition path,
particularly the course of wage inequality. Our model includes multiple traded and non-
traded goods whose production functions dierentially utilize high-skilled, middle-skilled,
and low-skilled labor as well as capital. Thanks to the projected catch-up of labor pro-
ductivity in China and India and the fact that these regions are relatively highly endowed
with low-skilled workers, there is an ongoing and very major increase in the world's rela-
16Note that we still assume that members of each income class inherit from their parents' skill class.
32Table 10: Limiting Growth in Healthcare Benets
Eective Pay- Average Consump-
Capital Labor Demand Wage roll Wage tion
Year GDP Stock Low Middle High Taxa Taxa Taxa Taxa;b
U.S.
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 39.1 15.6 13.5 11.1
2010 1.09 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.10 39.7 16.3 13.4 11.1
2030 1.63 1.74 1.61 1.55 1.63 48.1 22.8 14.4 12.2
2050 2.74 3.18 2.74 2.48 2.55 52.5 20.5 16.2 18.8
2100 4.59 4.82 5.03 4.41 4.44 58.4 26.3 16.6 18.4
EMU
2005 0.86 0.83 0.73 0.82 0.96 58.1 27.6 11.9 22.9
2010 0.91 0.88 0.77 0.86 1.01 59.0 28.9 11.9 22.3
2030 1.28 1.33 1.16 1.19 1.38 64.5 33.9 12.0 22.9
2050 1.91 2.19 1.80 1.69 1.88 68.5 32.3 12.7 30.8
2100 2.94 3.03 3.04 2.77 2.99 69.5 33.0 13.3 30.2
NEA
2005 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.53 58.6 27.1 14.4 20.7
2010 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.46 0.54 60.9 30.6 14.3 19.1
2030 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.74 59.4 29.5 13.7 19.4
2050 1.01 1.15 1.02 0.92 0.93 60.9 28.5 14.1 22.4
2100 1.29 1.36 1.47 1.25 1.22 59.2 28.6 15.0 18.5
China
2005 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.21 33.7 6.7 4.0 29.8
2010 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.43 29.6 5.6 3.1 26.4
2030 2.94 3.20 3.68 2.82 2.68 22.7 2.8 3.6 19.5
2050 5.27 6.76 7.78 4.80 3.89 19.6 4.6 3.5 13.0
2100 8.89 10.11 13.24 8.55 7.21 34.3 17.3 4.0 14.9
India
2005 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 26.3 6.1 4.0 19.3
2010 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 20.2 5.1 2.5 14.4
2030 1.27 1.38 1.39 1.20 1.23 20.4 2.3 3.1 17.6
2050 4.13 5.01 4.70 3.73 3.57 22.2 2.9 3.3 19.1
2100 11.08 12.58 16.17 10.65 9.08 32.7 14.2 4.1 16.8
a In percent; b These are nominal (tax exclusive) rates. The eective (tax inclusive) tax
rate (the nominal divided by 1 plus the nominal rate) is used in forming eective wage tax rates.
tive endowment of low-skilled labor. This spells portends further dramatic increases in
wage rate inequality over the century.
Our model also shows that the dramatic aging process now underway in the developed
world, China and, ultimately, India, coupled with very high projected growth rates in
government-nanced healthcare benets, will greatly challenge scal institutions leading
33Table 11: Successful Chinese and Indian Education Policy
Eective Pay- Average Consump-
Capital Labor Demand Wage roll Wage tion
Year GDP Stock Low Middle High Taxa Taxa Taxa Taxa;b
U.S.
2005 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 38.9 15.5 13.4 11.1
2010 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.11 40.6 16.5 13.8 11.5
2030 1.58 1.67 1.45 1.50 1.61 53.9 24.5 16.7 14.5
2050 2.55 2.88 2.13 2.32 2.55 58.4 22.2 18.1 22.1
2100 4.31 4.38 3.74 4.11 4.64 65.6 28.5 18.9 22.3
EMU
2005 0.86 0.83 0.73 0.83 0.97 57.9 27.5 11.8 22.9
2010 0.91 0.89 0.77 0.87 1.02 60.2 29.8 11.9 22.7
2030 1.25 1.29 1.00 1.14 1.40 70.6 39.3 12.0 23.9
2050 1.83 2.04 1.40 1.60 1.96 75.1 38.0 12.6 32.5
2100 2.80 2.80 2.24 2.60 3.21 76.5 38.6 13.3 32.6
NEA
2005 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.53 58.4 27.0 14.3 20.7
2010 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.46 0.54 62.1 31.5 14.4 19.4
2030 0.69 0.70 0.59 0.67 0.75 65.1 34.4 13.8 20.3
2050 0.94 1.05 0.79 0.87 0.95 67.0 34.0 14.0 23.3
2100 1.20 1.23 1.03 1.15 1.29 64.8 33.8 14.8 19.3
China
2005 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20 33.4 6.7 4.0 29.3
2010 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.43 29.8 5.9 3.1 26.2
2030 3.14 3.36 3.34 3.00 3.05 26.0 5.3 3.6 20.6
2050 5.79 7.16 6.19 5.17 4.96 27.4 11.4 3.6 14.1
2100 9.77 10.47 8.87 9.19 9.77 41.5 23.9 4.1 15.6
India
2005 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 26.1 6.1 4.0 19.1
2010 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 20.2 5.3 2.5 14.1
2030 1.37 1.46 1.23 1.28 1.41 23.1 4.5 3.1 18.3
2050 4.56 5.31 3.71 4.08 4.49 29.2 8.5 3.4 20.9
2100 12.23 13.07 10.94 11.53 12.29 40.2 20.6 4.2 18.2
a In percent; b These are nominal (tax exclusive) rates. The eective (tax inclusive) tax
rate (the nominal divided by 1 plus the nominal rate) is used in forming eective wage tax rates.
to tremendous increases in eective wage-tax rates { increases that are barely feasible in
our model and may be infeasible in the real world. Notwithstanding these tax hikes, the
model predicts world-wide capital deepening thanks to large supplies of capital forthcom-
ing from China and India, whose saving rates are assumed to remain relatively high over
34the medium term.
Excluding China and India from trade with the developed regions succeeds in limiting
wage-rate inequality. But it comes at a major cost to developed world output, reducing
the long-run (year 2100) GDP of the U.S., EMU, and Japan (plus Taiwan and Korea)
by 17 percent compared with the case of free trade. It also reduces capital intensivity,
raising the long-run real interest rate by 90 basis point. On the other hand, this policy
keeps the wage rates of low-skilled workers from falling over time, leaves the long-run
wage rate of middle-skilled workers essentially unchanged, and leaves the long-run wage
rates of high skilled workers 2.5 percent lower rather than 23 percent higher.17
In suggesting that trade with China and India may increasingly undermine the relative
prospects of low-skilled and middle-skilled workers, we don't contend that this troubling
aspect of globalization has been the dominant force in recent decades in exacerbating
income inequality. But the main future concern is surely the eective arrival of hundreds
of millions of low-skilled Chinese and Indian workers able to compete on equal terms with
low-skilled workers in the developed world.
Worsening wage rate inequality is not inevitable, however. As we show, if Chinese and
Indian education policies begin to produce new high-, middle-, and low-skilled workers in
the same proportions as now occurs in the developed regions, the exacerbation of wage
inequality can be fully reversed. Consequently, one of the best ways the developed world
can assist its unskilled workers is to help improve education in China and India.
17These wage rates are measured per eciency unit and abstract from the model's assumed increase
in the labor eciency of successive cohorts no matter their skill levels. This eciency increase, recall,
comes in the form of expansion in eective time endowments.
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